EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF A DUOPOLY SrrUATION
FROM THE STANDPOINr OF MATHEMATICAL LEARNING THEORYY Patrick Suppes and J. MerrillCarlsmith L Introduction. We assume that readers of' this journal are f'amiliar with the standard theories of' duopoly of' Cournot, Edgeworth, and more recent writers. We propose, with certain reservations discussed below, a new theory of' duopoly which is derived f'rom recent work in mathematical learning theory. It is very likely the case that economists will not take the theory too seriously as an economic theory. This we are prepared to accept. The evidence f'or the theory comes f'rom a highly structured, highly simplif'ied experimental situation. On the other hand, we do maintain that it is a serious theory of' behavior, and in so f'ar as the experimental situation bears resemblance to a real economic situation, the theory is directly relevant to economic behavior. The most important f'eature of' our theory is to provide a specif'ic dynamic mechanism f'or duopolistic behavior. Such a specif'ic mechanism is notably lacking in the theories of' Chamberlain and Mrs. Robinson and is only partly provided in recent game-theoretic approaches like that of ' Shubik [1959] . Moreover, the mechanism given here is f'ormulated in terms of' the psychological notions of' stimulus, response and reinforcement, and the psychological processes of' stimulus sampling and conditioning. These concepts yield a theory of' oligopoly that has a f'lavor considerably dif'f'erent f'rom that of' the theories based on concepts of' maximization and rational behavior.
In the next section we discuss the stimulus sampling f'ormulation of' mathematical learning theory employed in this paper and also consider a -2-simple choice situation to which the theory has af'ten been applied. In the third section, we briefly describe the specific duopoly situation with which we deal and then apply stimulus sampling theory in detail. The fourth section discusses the experimental setup. The final section consists primarily of an analysis of the experimental results.
2 . Stimulus sampling theory. Learning theory based on the notion of stimulus sampling was first formulated as a~uantitative theory in a basic paper by Estes [1950] . A more detailed formulation was given subse~uently in several papers by Estes and Burke [1953] , [1957] . The version to be considered here is most closely connected to that given in Suppes and Atkinson [1960] . Before giving a rather exact verbal statement of the assumptions or axioms from whi.ch we derive our results, it will be appropriate to give an intuitive description of stimulus sampling theory.
We think of the individual's making a se~uence of responses or decisions.
In a simple experiment it might be a response which consists of pressing one of two keys in order to predict whicb. one of two lights will flash.
In an economic context a response might be the~uarterly decision fixing the prices of all commodities produced by a firm. Stimulus sampling theory postulates that these responses are controlled by a set of stimuli in the environment from wbich the organism samples subsets. Each stimulus in this set is connected ('conditioned') to a possible response the organism may make. The experimenter typically re~uires that an overt response be cbosen from a finite set of possible responses at fixed intervals. In this case, the probability that the i th response in the set is made by the organism is given by the proportion of stimuli, sampled in a short interval prior to that response,which are conditioned to that response. In the simple two-choice key experiment it may be realistic to assume that there is but one stimulus, say the signal light which announces the beginning of a new trial. The stimuli relevant to the~uarterly pricing decision could be highly heterogeneous: the~uarterly gross profit of the firm, thẽ uarterly net profit of the firm, pricing policies of competitors during the past~uarter, etc.
After some particular response is made, an outcome occurs which is interpreted by the organism as reinforcing one of the possible reSponses.
In the simple two-choice experiment it is reasonable that the outcome of the left light flashing reinforces the left response with probability one.
,
The objective outcomes which follow in the wake of a~uarterly decision on prices have no such simple relations as reinforcers of possible responses, that is, possible pricing decisions for the next~uarter. In the experimental situation we consider in this paper, there are varying amounts of reward, representing units of gross profit, as outcomes. Leta. be J,n the jth outcome on trial n, that is the amount of gross profit received E k,n on trial and let n ; let·A be the i th response, i,n be the k th reinforcing event,
Put into words, c ijk is the probability that profit O. and response A. , and E reinforces response~, n The notation of (1) , l,n 2,n and the concepts behind it, have been discussed extensively in Estes and Suppes [1959a], [1959b] and in Suppes and Atkinson [1960] . For simplicity of notation, since we have only two response, we define:
c.(j) = P(E. 10.A. )
1.
l,n J,n l,n
It should be noted that the set of stimuli available for sampling may vary systematically from trial to trial, in which case a discrimination learning problem is introducedo A simple example is the two-choice key
of a single signal light we introduce two lights, one red and one green, and arrange the outcomes so that the left side is always correct following the green signal light and the right side is always correct following the red light. Then the two stimuli, red and green lights, will become conditioned to their respectively correct responseso In this case, of course, the sampling of some of the stimuli is not under the organism's control. Similarly, in the quarterly pricing context, the prices set by other firms may well serve as stimuli which it is important to discriminate between. In the duopoly experiment reported here, one of the two groups of SUbjects was given information about the prices set by their competitors on each trial, and the other group was not.
If these preliminary remarks are borne in mind, the axioms of stimulus sampling theory, which we now give, should be easily understood. Itmust be realized, of course, that understanding of the axioms does not necessarily entail understanding how to apply them in detail to any behavioral situation, for extensive empirical study may be re~uired to identify the stimuli, outcomes, and responses which are important for predicting behavior in the situation.
The first group of axioms deals with the conditioning of stimuli, the second group with the sampling of stimuli, and the third with responses.
For reasons of simplicity we have restricted outselves to the assumption that exactly one stimulus is sampled on every trial and, in the actual application of the axioms, to the still stronger assumption that exactly one stimulus. is available for sampling. However, these restrictive assumptions are not an essential part of the theory.
CONDITIONING AXIOMS
CI. On every trial each stimulus is conditioned to exactly one response. c4. The probability ci(j) that~sampled stimulus is conditioned to response Ai is independent of the trial number and the occurrence of preceding events.
SAMPLING AXIOMS
Sl, Exactly one stimulus is sampled~each trial, S2. Given the set of' stimuli available f'or sampling~~given trial, probability of' sampling~parti.cular element~independent of' the trial number and the occurrence of' preceding event s .
RESPONSE AXIOM
R1, On each trial that response is made to which the sampled stimulus is conditioned, It may be remarked that Axi.oms cit-and S2 are "independence of' path" assumptions which are necessary to prove the theorem that when exactly one stimulus is available the sequence of' r~sponse random variables~1'~2"'"
A ,'" is a Markov chain, Of' course, in the duopoly situation it is the -n sequence of' pairs of' response random variables which f'orms the chain.
Detailed proof' of' the theorem may be f'ound in Estes and Suppes [1959b] .
The developments of' the next section in terms of' Markov chains are all based on the th.eorem, It may also be noted that an exact deductive development of' the particular Markov processes we consider may be given f'rom these axioms, although detailed proof's will not be presented here, For those subjects who were told the price set~y their competitor at the end of' each trial, it is natural to identif'y this price as the most important stimulus f'or the next trial, In this case the stimulus available f'or sampling may change f'rom trial to trial, and the experimental situation may be analyzed as a discrimination problem, involving learning to make a dif'f'erential response to dif'f'erent stimuli, Once the stimuli are identif'ied as the prices set by the competitor, the derivation of the appropriate Markov process is a straightforward matter. Unfortunately, it is also very tedious, for the process has 64 states.
For this reason we do not analyze this discrimination setup in greater detail. Fortunately i.n the present experiment the evidence is that there was little difference between the pairs of subjects who were told their competitors' pricesand those who were not; detailed analysis relevant to this point is given in the final section.
3. Application to duopoly. The simplified duopoly situation described to the subjects is as follows: there are tw firms which completely control the output of a given commodity. Their standards of 'luality are identical.
Each .firm is able to produce 6 units per 'luarter. Production costs are assumed constant, independent of the number of items produced. It is assumed that the market consists of eight consumers who are willing to pay different amounts for the commodity.gj The firms are restricted to two prices, "high" and "low," which we often abbreviate H and L Six of the consumers will pay the high price and all eight will pay the low price. When both firms set the same price, the available consumers (six or eight as the case may be) are distributed randomly between them. Thus if both firms set the high price, the distri.bution of consumers is binomial with n = 6 , If both set the low price, n=8 and p=!.)/ 2
If one firm sets the high price and the other the low price, then the latter sells six items and the former sells 0, 1 or 2 with the appropriate hypergeometric distribution, that is, with probability 1/28, 12/28 or 15/28 respectively.
In terms of expected gross profits, the situation may be represented by the following 2 X2 matrix for a two-person, non-zero-sum game:
The outcome is (18,18) when both firms set the monopoly price of H.
On the other hand, the e'lu11ibrium. point in the sense of Nash Is the pair On the basis of (5) and (6), the number of free parameters in the transition matrix is reduced to 4, and the matrix assumes a rather simple form in terms Of these four parameters. Before wri tingdown the complete matrix, we compute Some of the transition probabilities to indicate the methods. For this purpose we simplify (5) and (6) by letting i = j/4 in (5) and i = j/6 in (6) •
We then have, for example:
And 2 2 = a + 8ab + 14b
Applying the same methods to the other transition probabilities, we obtain the following transition matrix in terms of the f01ll'parameters a, b, a and /3 , where 2 42
There are three important observations to be made about the kind of economic behavior implied by the transition matrix (9)
In the first place, unlike the theory of Cournot and many other writers, the theory does not predict the eventual adoption of a pure strategy by either firm. Secondly, unlike the Edgeworth theory and others which predict cyclic behavior, the present theory predicts random fluctuations in behavior for both firms.
Equilibrium exists, but in a statistical rather than deterministic sense.
Thirdly, the present theory is more detailed than the classical economic theories of duopoly, for innumerable predictions about sequential behavior can be made from (9) and even more from the full theory embodied in the axioms given earlier. As already remarked, from the standpoint of behavior theory, much of classical economic theory is defective in not providing a detailed analysis of the dynamic process by which equilibrium is reached.
(This same defect is characteristic of many psychological theories of behavior. )
Below is the specific demand curve we have postulated for this market. (The linear demand curve was shown to sUbjects.)
Each of you can set the price of your product independently at either four or six un1.ts per calculator. You will note that if both of you set price four, there is total demand eight, while if both set price six, there is demand for six machines. Your costs in producing these calculators are assumed to be constant;
that is, so far as cost is concerned, it is immaterial to you whether you produce two or six calculators.
To be more specific about the demand curve and the behavior of the consumers, we may imagine that it is made up of twelve consumers, the first of whom is willing to pay up to twelve units for a machine, the second, up to eleven units, etc. Thus, if both of you set price four, there are eight cons-amers who will pay four units or more, and all will attempt to buy a machine.
If you both set the same price, the consumers are indifferent as to whom they buy from, and so decide essentially at random. Thus the number of customers buying from each of you will vary randomly from period to period in the event that you both set the same price.
If one of you sets price four and the other sets price six, then all consumers will attempt to buy at the lower price, and the first six to get there (recall that you can only produce six machines) will buy. The remaining two will bUy at the higher price if and only if they were among those who were originally Willing to pay the high price. That is, among the eight consumers who were willing to buy at the cheap price, there were two who would only buy at that price and i~they were not among the six served, they will not pay the high price.
As strict competitors, you are not allowed to get together and~orm a monopoly. In~act, no communication will be allowed between the two o~you. Each of' you will set his price independently, tell me that price and I will calculate resulting .sales and pro~its~or each. The experiment will then consist simply oã large .number o~these decisions. As I mentioned be~ore, costs are~ixed and will be~ourteen units per quarter. Thus, we will subtract~ourteen~rom your gross sales each period, and the resulting~igure is your pro~it or loss~or that period. We will use these chips to keep track o~your pro~its and losses, and pay you at the end~or the chips you have.
Questions were answered by paraphrasing the instructions, and the subjects were then run~or 200 trials. The amount o~sales~or each subject~or a~ixed pair o~prices was determined in advance~rom a table o~random numbers in accordance with the distributions described above • Ten pairs o~subjects were run in each of the two experimental groups.
In both groups, the gross profits on each trial of each~irm were s.nnounced to both members of the pair. In addition, in Group T ('Told') the price that each player had set was announced. In Group N ('Not Told'), gross profits were announced, and prices set by the opponent were Eleveral other comments may be made about these curves. First, it is clear that there are no major dif'f'erences between the two experimental groups.
Amore exact test of' this hypothesis will be presented later, but it is apparent to the eye that knowledge of' the opponent's price on the previous trial does not seriously af'f'ect the average behavior of' the subjects.
El",cond, it is clear that the subjects are in no sense maximizing their joint utility. There is, with the exception of' one pair of' SUbjects, no evidence of' collusion at the monopoly price. One pair of' subjects in the 'Told '. group did both set the hilS-Q price f'or approximately~O trials, but no oth",r subjects were able to maintain this COllusive behavior f'or more than a f'ew trials.
The next question we ask is whether, as the theory demands, the behavior of' the subjects is in f'act Markovian in the responses. .TO test . ."
,4 was not run~or the last 100 trials because too many o~the cell entries were close to zero (see Table 1 below).
Another demand o~the speci~ic model we have proposed here (which does not hold~or the multi-stimulus model) is that the process is stationary in the observable response pairs, i.e., that the transition probabilities Pij do not change over time. This hypothesis can also be tested independently of the model, again using a x?-test given by Anderson and Goodman [1957] . The test can be made separately for each row o~the matrix, and in both groups, the dif~erences in the~irst row (L,L) are highly significant, while the other three rows are not. Thus there is some evidence that the process is not stationary, although in our opinion it is not serious enough to~orce a rejection of the model.
When the transition probabilities of a Markov process are independent of the trial number, the transition numbers n ij , which summarize the number of transitions from state i to state j , form a set of sui'ficient statistics for the process. Table 1 shows the transition numbers for both
Insert Table 1 about here. experimental groups, split into the first 100 and last 100 trials. It is clear that With the exception of the last row in the last 100 trials, the two groups are essentially identical. The distorting entry '1m: = 47 is due to the one pair of subjects mentioned above who did adopt collusive strategies for approxiJJlately 40 trials. Applying a ..;-test of homogeneity to test the null hYPothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same Markov chain (Anderson and Goodman [1957] ), we find that for the first 100 trials, the resulting ..;-(7.51, df = 12, P = .90) is not significant, and for the second block of 100 trials the ..;-is also not significant when cells with entries of less than 5 are ignored.
Because of this relatively close agreement, we felt justified in combining the two groups in much of what follows.
Turning now to more specific predictions of the theory proposed here, Figure 3 shows the functions ci(j) , plotted separately for the first 100
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
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It is interesting to note that~> b for both the first and last 100 trials, which we take to indicate that when subjects set the rather risky high price they are more sensitive to the exact amount of reward than in the case of setting the conservative low price.
Of the four linear fits the one for the high price on the last 100 trials is clearly the worst. The evident departure from linearity warrants further stUdy in other experimental situations, for it is to be .emphasized that the exact character of the goodness-of-fit results discussed below depend heavily upon the assumption that the conditioning parameters ci (j) are linear in the amount of reward. It is apparent from inspection of
Figoll?e 3 that the linearity assumption is not a bad one in three of the four cases.
It is to be remarked that the assumption of linearity at this point is not equivalent to the assumption of a utility function which is linear in money. The conditioning parameters c i (j) mainly describe the changes in conditioning from trial to trial, given the reinforcement and response.
The new response occurs on an all or none basis of conditioning and is not due to an estimation of expected utility. Even if a utility interpretation were given to the response probabilities (see Suppes [1959] ), the conditioning parameters would essentially describe, not utilities, but changes in utilities.
Having .estimated the parameters a, b, a and~we may obtain the predicted transition matrix shown in Suppes and Atkinson [1960] .)
The theoretical matrix may be used to predict the mean asymptotic probability of response. In Figure 4· , the learning curves in 20 trial blocks, with the data pooled from both groups, are shown for the probabilities Insert Figure 1 ; about here. Several other remarks may be made about the experiment. It may be argued that the data were collected in such a highly structured and oversimplified situation tha,t they have little relevance to economic beha,vior. This is possibly true, and it would of course be desirable to collect ~22s imila,r' data in the field. But then one runs into the problem of lack of control of many variables -which are obviously relevant, but which a,r'e not as yet incorporated into the theory. It was primarily for this reason that we chose to do the -e:x:periment in the laboratory, where it was possible -to control many more of these variables. This is, of course, common pra~tice in psychology but economists have not generally adopted this view.
It is also true that we were using naive subjects. It is likely that two sophisticat_ed economists or businessmen would have reacted differently in this setting, perhaps settling on the advantageous monopoly price.
Although this statement .should be verified before it is accepted, it is a not unreasonable hypothesis, since the situat.ion is extremely simple, and the results of any behayior can be easily computed without performing the behavior. However, in a more complicated market, the businessman cannot so easily compute the result of any given behavior. He would seem rather to be in the :position of our subjects who must perform the behavior, receive the reinforcement and react accordingly. Thus, we would expect the businessman to behave in a manner describable by the kind of reinforcement and conditioning ideas we have tried to isolate (and we would be willing to disc01L~t most of his verbal rationalizations derived from his knowledge of economic theory).
Finally, it is certainly true that the theory is at present far too simple to describe much actual economic behavior. The direction of generalization seems clear, although problems, both experimental and mathematical, are present. For example, one obvious need is the~ontinuous been most helpful. The paper will appear in the reprint series of the Stanford Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences.
2. The description of the market given subjects, which is described in the next section, differs on this point, but not in such a.way as to affect the actual market transactions.
3. For mathematical simplicity, we permitted each firm the possibility of selling 8 units when both set the low price. However, this event occurs with low probability and no sullject noted the discrepancy betWeen 5. It is, of course, possible in most (but not aU) cases to determine the opponent I s price On the previous trial from the total sales.
However, Only one subject in Group N gave any indication of doing thia.
6. The instability of the .endpoints is due to the small number of observations available to estimate c L (0) • No subjects received gross income j =36 , and thUS this point does not occur on the abscissa.
